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.:: A novel page-UAF exploit strategy ::.

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Current issue : #71 | Release date : 2024-08-19 | Editor : Phrack Staff
IntroductionPhrack Staff
Phrack Prophile on BSDaemonPhrack Staff
LinenoisePhrack Staff
LoopbackPhrack Staff
Phrack World NewsPhrack Staff
MPEG-CENC: Defective by SpecificationDavid "retr0id" Buchanan
Bypassing CET & BTI With Functional Oriented ProgrammingLMS
World of SELECT-only PostgreSQL InjectionsMaksym Vatsyk
A VX Adventure in Build Systems and Oldschool TechniquesAmethyst Basilisk
Allocating new exploitsr3tr074
Reversing Dart AOT snapshotscryptax
Finding hidden kernel modules (extrem way reborn)g1inko
A novel page-UAF exploit strategyJinmeng Zhou, Jiayi Hu, Wenbo Shen, Zhiyun Qian
Stealth Shell: A Fully Virtualized Attack ToolchainRyan Petrich
Evasion by De-optimizationEge BALCI
Long Live Format StringsMark Remarkable
Calling All Hackerscts
Title : A novel page-UAF exploit strategy
Author : Jinmeng Zhou, Jiayi Hu, Wenbo Shen, Zhiyun Qian
                             ==Phrack Inc.==

                Volume 0x10, Issue 0x47, Phile #0x0D of 0x11

|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-------------=[  A novel page-UAF exploit strategy for  ]=-------------=|
|=-------------=[  privilege escalation in Linux systems. ]=-------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=---------=[ Jinmeng Zhou, Jiayi Hu, Wenbo Shen, Zhiyun Qian ]=---------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|

0 - Introduction
1 - Exploitation background
  1.0 - Object-level UAF
  1.1 - Previous page-level UAF in cross-cache attacks
2 - General idea
3 - Page-UAF exploitation steps
  3.0 - Page-level UAF construction
  3.1 - Critical object corruption through page-level UAF
4 - Evaluation results
  -- 4.0 - Bridge objects
  -- 4.1 - Real-World Exploitation Experiments
  -- 4.2 - Comparison of our page-UAF with previous methods
5 - References


-- 0 - Introduction

Many critical heap objects are allocated in dedicated slab caches in the 
Linux kernel. Corrupting such objects requires unreliable cross-cache 
corruption methods [1][2][3][4], due to the unstable page-level fengshui. 
To overcome this, we propose a novel page-UAF-based exploit strategy to 
overwrite critical heap objects located in dedicated slab caches. 

This method can achieve local privilege escalation without requiring any 
pre-existing infoleak primitive (i.e., no need to bypass KASLR); it can 
help derive the infoleak primitive and arbitrary write primitive. 

We developed 8 end-to-end exploits (https://github.com/Lotuhu/Page-UAF) 
by using our page-UAF technique.


-- 1 - Exploitation background

-- 1.0 - Object-level UAF

The standard exploitation of object-level UAF leverages the invalid use of 
a freed heap object (vulnerable object) via a dangling pointer. This use 
can corrupt another object (target object) that takes the place of the 
freed slot. For instance, to hijack control flow, we can corrupt a 
function pointer within the target objects using the target value obtained 
from a pre-existing information leakage primitive. The object-level UAF 
exploitation requires the target object to reuse the freed slot 
(previously the vulnerable object). Thus, the vulnerable object and the 
target object must be allocated in the same slab cache (typically in 
standard caches, e.g., kmalloc-192) and require object-level heap fengshui 
to manipulate the memory layout. Dirtycred utilizes a critical-object-UAF 
to achieve privilege escalation, using cred and file objects [4].


-- 1.1 - Previous page-level heap fengshui in cross-cache attacks

Nowadays, many critical target objects are allocated in the dedicated 
caches (e.g., cred), rendering simple object-level heap fengshui 
ineffective. To corrupt these objects, we have to launch cross-cache 
attacks that usually rely on page-level heap fengshui [1][2][6]. The 
page-level heap fengshui of OOB and UAF are different.

For OOB bugs, typically, an attacker would trigger overflows onto a 
subsequent page [1][2]. For instance, after saturating a page (referred 
to as "page 1") with many vulnerable objects, the attacker can allocate 
target objects to make the slab cache request the following page (referred 
to as "page 2"). Consequently, the last vulnerable object on page 1 
becomes adjacent to the first target object on page 2, facilitating 
overflow from the former to the latter. We can't make sure that the 
vulnerable object is the last object on page 1 due to protections such as 
CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM. This page-level heap fengshui requires the 
manipulation of page allocation in the buddy system, making the exploits 
more unstable.

For UAF bugs, a common strategy is to convert an object-level UAF into 
a page-level UAF. Specifically, the idea is to release many vulnerable 
objects (one or more of which are freed illegally with dangling pointers) 
to force the entire page to be freed. After that, allocate many target 
objects so that the same page will be repurposed for the objects' 
dedicated slab cache. Finally, the dangling pointer can be used to 
overwrite the target object in another cache by page-level UAF.


-- 2 - General idea

Our idea is to induce page-level UAF by causing the free() of specialized
objects (we term them "bridge objects") that correspond to memory pages.
A bridge object is of a type that contains a pointer to the struct page 
and is located in standard slab caches. Among others, struct pipe_buffer 
is such an example with a field named page (and located in kmalloc-192). 
We list the code snippet below:

    struct pipe_buffer {
      struct page *page;
      unsigned int offset, len;
      const struct pipe_buf_operations ops;
      unsigned int flags;
      unsigned long private;
    };

Freeing such bridge objects will automatically cause the corresponding 4KB
page to be freed, effectively leading to a page-level UAF primitive. This 
is because an object of type struct page (which by itself is 64 bytes in 
recent Linux kernels) is used to manage a 4KB physical page in the kernel. 
Through such a bridge object, an attacker can read/write the entire 4KB 
memory, which can be reclaimed for other objects (including those stored 
in dedicated slab caches, e.g., struct cred). This is because the freed 
pages can be returned to the buddy allocator for future slab allocations. 
Finally, attackers can overwrite the critical objects in such slabs to 
achieve privilege escalation (e.g., setting the uid in cred to 0).

A prior work [3] also attempted to corrupt a page pointer (in pipe_buffer) 
to construct page-UAF and achieve privilege escalation. Our technique 
further defines and generalizes such a page-UAF technique. We will discuss 
more differences in detail in Section 4.2, after introducing our exploit 
technique. 


-- 3 - Exploitation steps

The page-UAF exploit strategy consists of two main steps: page-level UAF
construction and critical object corruption, as discussed in the following.


-- 3.0 - Page-level UAF (Use After Free) construction.

Starting from a memory corruption bug that provides an invalid write of
memory, e.g., OOB, UAF, or double free, we can first spray multiple bridge
objects (at least two) that co-locate with the vulnerable object.

Specifically, for bugs with standard OOB or UAF write primitives, we can 
use the write primitive to corrupt the page pointer field in a bridge 
object (e.g., the first field of pipe_buffer) such that it points to 
another 64-byte page object nearby. This effectively causes two pointers 
to point to the same object. A user-space program can trigger free_pages() 
on one of the objects (e.g., by calling close()), which will create a 
dangling pointer to the freed page object and the corresponding physical 
page. In other words, we can read/write the corresponding physical page 
that is now considered freed by the OS kernel. For example, one can write 
to a pipe, which will lead to a write of the physical page via the 
pipe_buffer object.

For bugs that have double-free primitives, which can often be achieved 
from UAF by triggering the free() operation twice, we do the following. 
For the first free, we spray a harmless object (e.g., msg_msg) to take 
the freed slot. The object should take attacker-controlled values from 
the user space. Then, we trigger the kernel code to write the harmless 
object until reaching a certain offset, using the FUSE technique[1] to 
stop the writing right before a planned offset - corresponding to the 
page pointer field of a planned bridge object. Now, we trigger the free 
for a second time to spray the planned bridge object to take the slot. 

The writing process is restarted to continue overwriting the lower bits 
of the page pointer field, which leads to a page UAF. Previously, to 
trigger page-level frees from double frees, one had to release an entire 
slab and then do a cross-cache technique [1][2], whereas no such 
requirement is needed in our exploit method.

For a standard OOB and UAF bug, we use the following figures to 
demonstrate the memory layout better in various exploitation steps. 
To start, we have at least two bridge objects (pipe_buffer1 and 
pipe_buffer2) that contain a field of type struct page. The pointers 
point to two adjacent page objects that correspond to two continuous 
4KB physical pages. Below is the memory layout before triggering the 
OOB/UAF corruption:


               page *               page *
    ----------[---+---------------][---+---------------]---------- 
              [ * | pipe_buffer1  ][ * | pipe_buffer2  ]            
    slab cache[ * |               ][ * |               ]             
              [ * |               ][ * |               ]            
    ----------[-+-+---------------][-+-+---------------]----------  
                |                    |                              
                +---------+          | 
                          |          |
                          v          v                         
    -----------------[---------][---------]-----------------------  
                     [  page1  ][  page2  ]
    page pool        [         ][         ]
                     [         ][         ]
    -----------------[----+----][----+----]-----------------------  
                          |          |                               
                          |          +------------+ 
                          |                       |
                          v                       v      
    ----------+-----------------------+-----------------------+---  
    physical  |      4KB page1        |      4KB page2        |
    page      |                       |                       |
              |                       |                       |
    ----------+-----------------------+-----------------------+---  


Now, we corrupt the page pointer within pipe_buffer1 to cause it to point 
to page2 - this can be achieved by overwriting the lower bits of the 
pointer field, similar to what DirtyCred requires [4]. This makes the 
pointers in both pipe_buffer1 and pipe_buffer2 point to the same page 
object (as shown below). At this point, we can release the page2 object 
(along with its corresponding 4KB physical page) through the pointer in 
pipe_buffer1. As a result, the page pointer within pipe_buffer2 becomes 
a dangling pointer pointing to the freed page. The memory layout after 
triggering corruption is shown in the figure below:


               page *               page * (dangling pointer)
    ----------[---+---------------][---+---------------]---------- 
              [ * | pipe_buffer1  ][ * | pipe_buffer2  ]            
    slab cache[ * |               ][ * |               ]             
              [ * |               ][ * |               ]            
    ----------[-+-+---------------][-+-+---------------]----------  
                |     release        |                              
                +------------------+ | 
                                   | |
                                   v v                         
    -----------------[---------][---------]-----------------------  
                     [  page1  ][..page2..]
    page pool        [         ][.........]
                     [         ][.........]
    -----------------[----+----][----+----]-----------------------  
                          |          |                               
                          |          +------------+ 
                          |                       |
                          v                       v      
    ----------+-----------------------+-----------------------+---  
    physical  |      4KB page1        |......4KB page2........|
    page      |                       |.......................|
              |                       |.......................|
    ----------+-----------------------+-----------------------+--- 


-- 3.1 - Critical object corruption through page-level UAF

Now that we have a freed a physical page and a dangling pointer that can 
read/write to it. It is fairly easy to then allocate and corrupt critical 
heap objects. This is because the critical heap objects are eventually 
allocated through the buddy allocator at the page granularity. Therefore, 
attackers can spray the heap objects into the freed page as long as they 
have already exhausted all existing slab caches. For example, we can 
overwrite the cred object through the dangling pointer, as shown in the 
following figure:


               page *               page * (dangling pointer)
    ----------[---+---------------][---+---------------]---------- 
              [ * | pipe_buffer1  ][ * | pipe_buffer2  ]            
    slab cache[ * |               ][ * |               ]             
              [ * |               ][ * |               ]            
    ----------[-+-+---------------][-+-+---------------]----------  
                |                    |                              
                +------------------+ | 
                                   | |
                                   v v                         
    -----------------[---------][---------]-----------------------  
                     [  page1  ][  page2  ]
    page pool        [         ][         ]
                     [         ][         ]
    -----------------[----+----][----+----]-----------------------  
                          |          |                               
                          |          +------------+ 
                          |                       |
                          v                       v            
    ----------+-----------------------+[------][------]-------+---  
    physical  |      4KB page1        |[ cred ][ cred ]       |
    page      |                       |[      ][      ] ...   |
              |                       |[      ][      ]       |
    ----------+-----------------------+[------][------]-------+---  


-- 4 - Evaluation results

We analyzed the bridge objects in the Linux kernel v5.14. We took a sample 
of  26 recent Linux kernel CVEs that are either OOB, UAF, or double-free 
from 2020 to 2023. This includes 24 vulnerabilities from prior work [4], 
and 2 additional OOB ones missed by the prior work.


-- 4.0 - Bridge objects

We found many objects containing page pointers, which reside in various
standard slab caches of different sizes. The Linux kernel has interfaces 
to read/write the physical pages through the page pointers, such as
copy_page_from_iter and copy_page_to_iter (iter usually represents a user
buffer). We list the the bridge objects followed by the slab caches used 
to allocate them as follows:

    address_space->i_pages (adix_tree_node_cachep)
    configfs_buffer->page (kmalloc-128)
    pipe_buffer->page (variable size)
    st_buffer->reserved_pages (variable size)
    bio_vec->bv_page (variable size)
    wait_page_queue->page (variable size)
    xfrm_state->xfrag->page (kmalloc-1k)
    pipe_inode_info->tmp_page (kmalloc-192)
    lbuf->l_page (kmalloc-128)
    skb_shared_info->frags->bv_page (variable size)
    orangefs_bufmap_desc ->page_array (variable size)
    pgv->buffer (variable size)

We denote some objects as "variable size" whose sizes could be different 
at runtime due to different allocation paths. Some objects are allocated 
as arrays with variable sizes using standard kmalloc caches, such as 
pipe_buffer, which can be general to many bugs causing memory corruption 
in the standard caches (e.g., kmalloc-192).

In addition, certain functions, such as process_vm_rw_core(), allocate 
page pointers into the heap and store them in a page array, which can also 
be used wih the page-UAF strategy.


-- 4.1 - Real-World Exploitation Experiments

We confirm that 18 out of the 26 CVEs we examined are exploitable using 
our proposed technique by manually analyzing the CVE's capabilities. In 
total, we developed 8 end-to-end exploits for 4 CVEs (open source at
https://github.com/Lotuhu/Page-UAF), due to time constraints. The 8
unexploitable CVEs are not suitable because they are not general to heap
objects and can only reach certain objects in specific subsystems, e.g., 
eBPF subsystem.

Specifically, we developed 8 end-to-end exploits against CVE-2023-5345,
CVE-2022-0995, CVE-2022-0185, and CVE-2021-22555. The exploits spray 
bridge objects to construct page UAF; we specifically target 
pipe_buffer->page, configfs_buffer->page, and pgv->buffer. These exploits 
are generally easier and more stable because there is no need for 
infoleaks, cross-cache attacks, and page-level fengshui.

One exploit against CVE-2023-5345 uses another bridge object, i.e.,
configs_buffer, which also has a field pointing to a newly allocated page.
This object is a little different from pipe_buffer; it has a field with 
type char *, but it points to the first byte of a newly allocated physical 
page. 

Specifically, `buffer->page = (char *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, 0);`. 

After making a page-UAF by corrupting the lower bits, we can read/write 
the whole physical page's content by triggering the `copy_to_iter` and 
`copy_from_iter` in function `configfs_read_iter` and 
`configfs_write_iter`:


    struct configfs_buffer {
        size_t    count;
        loff_t    pos;
        char      * page;
        ...
    }


-- 4.2 - Comparison of our page-UAF method with previous methods

As we can see, our page-UAF exploit strategy can achieve privilege 
escalation without requiring infoleaks to bypass KASLR. Additionally, it 
offers the capability to leak information via the reading of physical page 
memory. It can also help derive arbitrary write primitives via writing to 
objects that have pointers in the physical page. Overall, the exploit 
strategy reduces the requirements for memory layout manipulation to use 
object-level heap fengshui - only the initial fengshui is required to 
derive the page-level UAF.

To our knowledge, we have yet to see widespread use of bridge objects to
achieve page-level UAF in real-world exploits. The only example we are 
aware of is a CTF competition [3] that uses the struct pipe_buffer as a 
bridge object. There are several differences. 

First, we made the observation that page-UAF is not limited to the 
pipe_buffer object. Instead, any object containing a page pointer can be 
a useful object for spray and corrupt, i.e., bridge objects. In fact, 
pipe_buffer is isolated into a dedicated slab called "kmalloc-cg" after 
Linux kernel v5.14, and will require cross-cache exploit technique to 
operate in the future. 

Second, our work analyzes many potential bridge objects that have a field 
that manages one/multiple physical pages, and further finds feasible paths 
to copy the user buffer from/to the physical pages. Therefore, we make the 
generalized page-UAF technique more usable and future-proof. 

Third, we simplified the exploitation process significantly compared to 
[3]: the prior work triggered the page-pointer write twice to construct 
the two-level nested page-UAF primitive, which we show is unnecessary and 
achieves a lower overall success rate (75% as reported). 

Our exploit requires only one page-UAF and simply sprays critical objects 
into the freed page for corruption, achieving a 90%-100% success rate. 
For example, we spray the  pipe_buffer objects and corrupt one of the 
"flags" fields, which can write a read-only file (/etc/passwd) to achieve 
privilege escalation.

Exploits using our page-UAF strategy are relatively stable due to the 
provided information leaking primitive and avoidance of page-level heap 
fengshui. We ran five end-to-end exploits for vulnerabilities 
CVE-2022-0995 and CVE-2022-0185. Each exploit was run 10 times, achieving 
a 90%-100% success rate without any crashes. This is attributed to the 
fact that the exploits have a built-in feedback mechanism (i.e., read of 
the physical page) that helps make sure the final write is performed on 
the right target. Using this feedback mechanism, we can restart the 
page-level UAF if the expected target is not detected.


-- 5 - References

[1] CVE-2022-27666: Exploit esp6 modules in Linux kernel.
https://etenal.me/archives/1825
[2] Reviving Exploits Against Cred Structs - Six Byte Cross Cache Overflow 
to Leakless Data-Oriented Kernel Pwnage.
https://www.willsroot.io/2022/08/reviving-exploits-against-cred-struct.html
[3] [D^3CTF 2023] d3kcache: From null-byte cross-cache overflow to infinite
arbitrary read & write in physical memory space.
https://github.com/arttnba3/D3CTF2023_d3kcache
[4] Zhenpeng Lin, Yuhang Wu, and Xinyu Xing. 2022. Dirtycred: escalating
privilege in Linux kernel. In Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference 
on Computer and Communications Security
[5] FUSE for Linux exploitation 101.
https://exploiter.dev/blog/2022/FUSE-exploit.html.
[6] Understanding Dirty Pagetable - m0leCon Finals 2023 CTF Writeup
https://ptr-yudai.hatenablog.com/entry/2023/12/08/093606


-- 6 - Source Code

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